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Previous studies of electoral participation in Latin America have focused
on the political and institutional factors that influence country differences in
the aggregate level of turnout. This paper provides a theoretical and empir-
ical examination of the individual-level factors that have an impact on citi-
zens’ propensity to vote. We test three theoretical perspectives that have been
used to explain electoral participation in industrialized democracies (voters’
resources, voters’ motivations, and mobilization networks). Using a series of
logistic and hierarchical models, we demonstrate that the demographic char-
acteristics of voters (age and education) and citizens’ insertion in mobilizing
networks (civic organizations and the working place) are strong predictors of
electoral participation in Latin America. Our analysis also confirms the im-
portance of contextual and institutional variables to explain turnout in the
region.
After thirty years of uninterrupted democratic rule in most Latin American coun-
tries, and despite the clear normative and political consequences of electoral partici-
pation (Lijphart, 1997; Pateman, 1976; Pitkin & Shumer, 1982), we still know very
little about the factors that affect individuals’ propensity to vote in Latin America.
Of course, we are not the first scholars interested in turnout in Latin American coun-
tries. Over the last decade, several scholars have investigated the determinants of the
cross-country differences in electoral participation (Fornos, Power, & Garand, 2004;
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Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n, 2001). These studies have demonstrated that a series of institutional and
contextual factors have a positive impact on turnout. Electoral participation increases
when registration procedures are efficient, when voting is compulsory and sanctions
for abstaining are enforced, and when legislative and presidential elections are held
concurrently. Turnout also tends to be higher in transitional elections (Kostadinova
& Power, 2007). Other scholars have analyzed the differences in electoral participa-
tion within countries, comparing turnout rates in different regions or municipalities
(e.g. Lehoucq & Wall, 2004; Remmer, 2010). These studies are informative about
the institutional and contextual factors that influence turnout in specific countries.
But they are not designed to address the question that interests us here, namely the
individual resources and motivations that increase the probability of voting in Latin
America. In fact, all these studies analyze aggregate levels of electoral participation
–at the national, regional, or local level–.The conventional wisdom holds that socioe-
conomic factors are not related with aggregate turnout in Latin American countries
(Fornos et al., 2004). Similarly, the studies of turnout at the subnational level have
found inconsistent evidence for the impact of variables such as literacy, wealth, and
population age on electoral participation.
In this paper, we re-assess the link between socio-demographic characteristics
and turnout at the individual level with recent survey data from 18 Latin American
countries. We also evaluate how citizens’ motivations and insertion in mobilizing
networks affect their likelihood of going to the polls. We find evidence that the
individual incentives to vote in Latin America are driven mainly by individual socio-
demographic attributes and insertion in mobilization networks. In particular, the
present paper demonstrates that older, educated, politically motivated, and civic-
active citizens are more likely to vote.
This paper will proceed as follows. First, we present the theoretical expectations
guiding this research. We introduce three explanations for voter turnout that have
dominated the study of electoral participation in Western democracies: voters’ re-
sources, voters’ motivations, and networks of mobilization. Second, we present the
data and the model estimation. Third, we describe the statistical results. The follow-
ing section goes further by discussing which variables are the strongest predictors of
electoral participation in Latin America, and which one of the three theoretical per-
spectives is more relevant in the Latin American context. The final section concludes
and suggests avenues for further research.
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Theory
The literature on electoral participation in Europe and the United States is immense.1
This literature has analyzed the impact of dozens of variables on the likelihood that
an individual will turn out on election day. In a seminal book, Verba, Schlozman, and
Brady (1995) created a useful theoretical framework to explain individual’s political
participation. They started off by inverting the traditional question, and asked why
some people do not take part in politics. Their framework suggests three different
answers to this question: they can’t because they lack necessary resources, they don’t
want to because they lack sufficient interest or knowledge, and nobody asked them
to because they fall outside of the traditional networks that rally voters. In other
words, their understanding of the participatory process rests on three main factors:
motivation, capacity, and networks of recruitment.
Verba et al. (1995) used this model to explain different forms of political partic-
ipation in the United States. But this framework was explicitly designed as a “road
map for the understanding of political participation in any democracy” (Verba et
al., 1995: 25). Given the dearth of previous research on electoral participation in
Latin America at the individual level, in this paper we make an important empiri-
cal contribution by assessing the validity of these different perspectives in the Latin
American context. Unlike other scholars (Fornos et al., 2004), we do not expect
Latin American citizens to behave in fundamentally different ways from American
and European voters. In other words, we expect that a series of variables associated
with these three perspectives (motivation, capacity, and networks of recruitment) will
also be correlated with electoral participation in Latin America. But the gist of our
empirical contribution attempts to assess which one of these broad categories of rea-
sons explains more. In other words, our paper is not so much about whether these
perspectives explain electoral participation in Latin America; but rather about how
much they explain.
Resources and Voters’ Capacity
Verba et al. (1995) argue that voting is a unique form of political engagement that is
less demanding in resources than working in campaigns, writing letters to government
officials, or donating money to party activities. Although voting requires less time
1For a good review of this literature, see Blais (2007).
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and money than other political activities, citizens still need a minimum of skills and
resources to understand what is at stake and to gain interest in the outcome of the
election.
The socio-economic status (SES) model of voter turnout has consistently shown
that income and education are positively associated with electoral participation at
the individual level. Individuals with a higher socioeconomic status are more likely to
turn out than poorer and less educated citizens (Leighley & Nagler, 1992; Verba, Nie,
& Kim, 1978; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). These studies suggest that citizens
with higher SES tend to have more free time to participate in political activities and
are better informed. More educated individuals are also more likely to understand
the issues at stake in the elections and to become politically interested (Brady, Verba,
& Schlozman, 1995). We expect then that the probability of voting increases when
the level of education increases.
Controlling for education, the level of income should be less directly related to
electoral participation, because voting requires minimal monetary resources. Still,
going to the polling station may require that citizens take some form of public trans-
portation. Even these minimal expenses may be prohibitive for the more destitute
voters, especially if they are not registered to vote in the place where they live. Hence,
we expect a difference in the likelihood of voting between the poorest voters and the
rest of the population, but we don’t expect a linear relationship between income and
turnout.
Another essential individual resource is political experience. Many studies demon-
strate that older citizens tend to vote more than their younger counterparts. Previous
research has found strong support for this relationship at the individual level both
in developed (Leighley & Nagler, 1992; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980) and in devel-
oping countries (Niemi & Barkan, 1987). In fact, political socialization takes time.
Young voters may be disoriented by the different electoral options, thereby preferring
not to vote. Political experience is acquired over time as citizens face concrete policy
issues (e.g. housing, taxation, health, social benefits), discuss about politics in the
workplace or in their social networks, and learn about the different programs political
parties propose to solve the problems they face. This process can take several years.
Hence, we expect that more experienced Latin American voters (i.e. older citizens)
tend to vote more than political neophytes (i.e. younger voters).
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Motivation
Not all the citizens that have the capacity to vote go to the polls on election day.
A key explanatory factor in Verba et al.’s model is motivation. Individuals that are
interested by political debates, and have enough political knowledge to understand
what is at stake are more likely to participate in elections.
Survey evidence demonstrates that satisfaction with democracy and trust in po-
litical institutions is in decline in Latin America (Booth & Seligson, 2009). This
widespread legitimacy crisis has been explained in terms of the gap between citizens’
expectations in Latin American countries and actual performance by the governments
in the region (Hagopian, 2005). Several studies have shown that citizens that do not
trust political institutions are less likely to engage in conventional political activities
(Norris, 2002). In the Latin American context, studies from Bolivia (Smith, 2009),
Chile (Carlin, 2006), and Costa Rica (Seligson, 2002) have demonstrated that citizens
with higher levels of support for democratic institutions are more likely to vote and to
participate in campaign activities. In this paper, we assess the impact of satisfaction
with democracy on electoral participation, and we expect that more disenchanted
voters are less likely to vote.
Another key motivational factor is the perception of electoral integrity. Most
Latin American elections are now described as reasonably free and fair by scholars
and international observations teams. Undeniably, the formal institutions of proce-
dural democracy have spread in Latin America in the last thirty years (Foweraker &
Krznaric, 2002). However, some electoral processes in the region are still marred by
a series of irregularities. One of the main problems is that incumbent parties tend
to benefit from a disproportionate access to public funds and to broadcast airtime.
Moreover, the electoral institutions that have to supervise the elections are in some
cases under the control of the executive (Hartlyn, McCoy, & Mustillo, 2008). These
irregularities may have a negative impact on citizens’ propensity to vote, because cit-
izens perceive the outcome of the election to be a foregone conclusion (Birch, 2010).
Hence, we expect that citizens that have low trust in the quality of elections in Latin
America are less likely to vote.
Political information can also affect citizens’ motivation to participate in the elec-
tions. Ghirardato & Katz (2002) demonstrate that voters are ambiguity-averse. In
other words, they only vote when they are sure that they support the right party,
i.e. the party that would yield the highest utility to the voter. The main conclusion
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from this study is that more informed citizens are more likely to vote, because they
feel more confident about their electoral choices. Hence, we expect that political in-
formation will also reveal itself as an important predictor of electoral participation in
Latin America.
Another important motivational factor is political efficacy. The feeling of political
efficacy can be described as the perception citizens have of being capable of acting
effectively in the political arena. Efficacious citizens perceive that they are capable
of influencing government and politics (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982). As a result, they
may be more motivated to go to the polls on election day. Recent studies using
comparative survey data have indeed shown that more efficacious voters are more
likely to vote (Karp & Banducci, 2008; Norris, 2002).
The final variable we consider in this section is party identification. Some stud-
ies argue that voting is basically an ”expressive” act, and only those citizens who
have something to express go to the polls on election day (Achen & Sinnott, 2007;
Schuessler, 2000). In the words of Achen and Sinnott (2007: 9), “the voters have
a sense of acting together with others on behalf of a shared goal, and they derive
satisfaction from doing so”. From that perspective, party identification is a key mo-
tivational variable. Citizens who are attached to a political party obtain a much
higher “expressive” benefit in the elections than those who fail to form political pref-
erences. Moreover, partisanship often works as a “short cut” for voters, helping them
to understand political debates and to choose among the different electoral options
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960).
Networks of Recruitment
Individual capacity and individual motivation are important determinants of turnout.
But the context in which citizens are immersed is also key to understand electoral
participation. All other things being equal, citizens who are immersed in networks of
political recruitment are more likely to be mobilized to vote.2
Social networks contribute to the mobilization of individuals. Political discussions
often occur in non-political institutions of adult life –the working place, voluntary
2Party mobilization is an important network of recruitment (Rosenstone Hansen, 1993). How-
ever, we cannot control for this factor in our statistical model because no item in the LAPOP surveys
directly asks respondents whether they have been contacted by political parties during the previous
election. This is an unfortunate limitation of the present study and deserves attention in future
research.
6
associations, or the church–. Hence, these institutions might nurture political interest
and increase awareness of the issues at stake in the elections (Verba et al., 1995).
Moreover, several studies show that large social networks produce politically relevant
social capital (i.e. expertise and political information), which in turn increases the
likelihood that citizens will participate in the elections (La Due Lake & Huckfeldt,
1998; Verba et al., 1995). In the American context, church attendance appears to be
especially relevant as a factor increasing the political engagement of “unsophisticated”
citizens (Alex-Assensoh & Assensoh, 2001; Verba et al., 1995). Kuenzi and Lambright
(2011) show that membership in voluntary organizations has a positive impact on
electoral participation in African countries. Drawing on data from the 1999-2001 wave
of the World Values Survey, Klesner (2007) demonstrates that greater involvement
in nonpolitical organizations also leads to more participation in political activities in
four Latin American countries (Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru). In line with
these previous studies, we expect that Latin American citizens immersed in rich
social networks have a higher likelihood of participating in elections. The probability
of voting should increase when individuals hold a stable job in the formal economy,
join voluntary organizations, and attend church regularly.
Another variable that will be considered in this section is place of residence. Karp
et al. (2007) contend that the higher population density of cities makes them more
attractive locations for parties to canvass. Other scholars argue that the “social
pressure” to turn out may be weaker in cities because urbanization tends to produce a
“weakening of interpersonal bonds, primary social structures and consensus on norms”
(Hoffmann-Martinot, 1994: 14). We will include a measure of place of residence
(urban vs. rural) in our model below, in order to assess which of these conflicting
theoretical expectations is more applicable to the Latin American context.
The literature on Latin American politics is replete with mentions of “clientelism”
and ”patronage” (e.g. Calvo & Murillo, 2004; Stokes, 2005). These clientelistic
practices appear to be one of the main ailments affecting the quality of democracy
in the region. Although the main objective of clientelistic machines is to alter the
electoral results in a way that suits the patron, they also work as a tool of electoral
mobilization. Even if voters may receive the benefits and vote as they choose, the
existence of strong clientelistic networks is likely to increase the incentives for citizens
to go to the polls (Nichter, 2008). In fact, it is much easier to supervise whether
citizens vote than how they vote. Hence, we expect citizens immersed in clientelistic
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networks to have a higher probability of voting than the rest of the respondents.
Research Design
Data
Data for the subsequent empirical analysis are drawn from the 2010 Americas Barom-
eter. The survey is administered by the Latin American Public Opinion Project
(LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. The sampling process involves multi-stage strat-
ification by country, and then sub-stratification within each country by major geo-
graphic region to increase precision. Within each primary sampling unit (PSU) the
survey respondents are selected randomly.3 Honduras drops from the pooled model
because one of the items included in our model was not asked in that country (expo-
sure to clientelism), leaving the number of countries analyzed at seventeen.4
Our main variable of interest is electoral turnout. We use a dichotomous measure
of the respondents who voted in the last presidential elections: 1 = yes, voted; 0 =
no, did not vote. This study focuses on reported turnout rather than actual turnout,
and privileges reports on past behavior rather than expectations about future voting
decisions.5
The key independent variables for our study are organized in three groups: ca-
pacity, motivation, and networking factors. The first group of variables captures
individuals’ capacity to vote. As we mentioned in the theory section such capac-
ity is determined by the amount of resources available for potential voters. The
key determinants of individual capacity to vote are socioeconomic and demographic
attributes. The socioeconomic attributes include income, and education. The demo-
graphic attributes include gender and age. Motivation variables measure the indi-
3More technical information can be obtained in the website:
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/core-surveys.php
4We include Honduras in Table 4, when we calculate a logistic regression for each individual
country.
5Although over-reporting may be a problem (Karp & Brockington, 2005), in this paper we follow
conventional practice and analyze reported turnout. Almost all studies of electoral participation at
the individual level –including all the works cited in this article– use surveys and analyze reported
turnout, because this is the data available. As a cautionary measure, however, we also ran all
the empirical analyses that follow excluding the cases for which the difference between actual and
reported turnout was substantial (more than 5%). The results were almost identical, which reinforces
our confidence in the findings. The results from these analyses are available upon request from the
authors.
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viduals’ interest for political issues, their ability to understand what is at stake in
the electoral process, and the degree to which they trust the electoral process and
the democratic regime. This set of variables includes questions about satisfaction
with democracy, trust in elections, political efficacy, interest in politics, party iden-
tification, and political awareness. The third group of independent variables seeks
to assess the importance of different networks for electoral mobilization. In this case
we evaluate how membership in different social and political organizations shapes
individuals’ propensity to vote. We measure respondents’ immersion in different mo-
bilizing networks (voluntary associations and clientelistic networks). We also consider
the position of the respondent in the labor market (employment status).6
The analysis of the impact of individual motivations and resources on electoral
participation definitely enhances our knowledge about electoral behavior in Latin
America. However, such knowledge would be incomplete if we do not take into account
other contextual variables shaping aggregate turnout at the country-level. For this
reason, we also include in our analysis important institutional and economic factors
that explain aggregate behavior. In line with previous literature, we consider the
effect of five institutional and contextual variables: compulsory voting, concurrent
elections, closeness of the electoral results, the level of democracy (Polity IV score),
and GDP per capita (Fornos et al., 2004; Kostadinova & Power, 2007; Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n,
2001).
To examine the effect of compulsory voting on aggregate electoral behavior, we
paid special attention to the government’s capacity (or willingness) to enforce the
legal mandate. Compulsory voting is only a formal obligation that could be ineffec-
tive if it is not accompanied by strong sanctions. Consequently, we created a scale
that takes a value of 0 when voting is voluntary, 1 when voting is compulsory but
there is no enforcement of this formal rule, and 2 when voting is both mandatory
and enforced. The information to create this variable comes from the IDEA’s com-
pulsory voting database. We also created a dummy variable to examine the effect of
concurrent elections (0 if presidential and legislative elections are not concurrent; 1
if they are concurrent). In addition, our analysis includes a measure of the closeness
of the election (i.e. the percentage gap between the first and the second most voted
candidates). Finally, we evaluate the effect of country-level economic development on
electoral behavior by collecting data on GDP per capita (Penn World Tables).
6All these variables are described in an on-line appendix.
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Model Estimation
Much of what we know about electoral turnout in Latin America is based on the
analysis of aggregate-level data. In this article, we use a large number of surveys
from diverse national contexts to explore variation in electoral participation and to
test our hypotheses about the specific kinds of motivations, resources, and networks
that may explain this variation.
First, we run logistic regression models to shed light on the effect of motivation,
resources, and networks on the decision to vote. The use of logistic regressions is ap-
propriate because our variable of interest –voter turnout– is a dichotomous variable.
In the second model, we also include dummy variables for each country to measure
whether significant national characteristics (unexplained by the model) lead to differ-
ent levels of system support.7 For these models, we rely on data from the Americas
Barometer 2010 for 30,075 respondents in 17 Latin American countries.
Our third model employs multilevel modeling to try to tease out the country-level
factors that have an impact on electoral participation. Multilevel models are quickly
becoming standard in political science (Snijders & Bosker, 1999) and are usually
estimated using either Bayesian simulations or a quasi-likelihood methods (Goldstein,
1995). The most important feature of these models for the purpose of this article is
that the estimates of variances and their associated standard errors provide direct
tests of the impact of measured contextual effects on turnout. Hierarchical models
also allow for a more precise estimation of individual-level factors because they control
for important contextual factors that may bias the results.
We use a mixed-effects model for binary responses because the grouping structure
of the data consists of two levels of nested groups (individuals nested in countries).
The first level of the model describes the distribution of the individual observations -
that, we assume are normally distributed- and transforms the model-based predicted
values. First-level predictors are grouped in three sets: resources, motivations, and
networks. Second-level are country-level predictors that explain aggregate electoral
behavior. In particular, we estimate a random coefficient model. In this type of mod-
els, the coefficients (or slopes) vary across clusters and we estimate separate income,
age, and education differences for each country. We assume that the differences are
drawn from a normal distribution and that the covariance matrix of the random ef-
7Estimates of the country dummies are not reported but the full model is available upon request
from the authors.
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fects is unstructured, that is, we allow correlation between the level of turnout and
the differences in income, age, and education in each country.
Results
Table 1 presents three models estimating voter turnout at the individual-level of
analysis. Model 1 estimates a logistic model for the effects of motivations, resources,
and networks on voting. In this first model, we clustered the standard errors by
country. Model 2 is a logistic regression with country fixed effects. Model 3 estimates
a multi-level random coefficient model.
The findings regarding the effect of resources on individual voting behavior are
revealing. More educated individuals are more prone to participate in electoral pro-
cesses. In fact, the likelihood that individuals will vote in presidential elections sig-
nificantly increases as they become more educated. Our results also offer convincing
evidence in support of the argument that older individuals are more likely to vote than
younger individuals. The coefficient for the variable age is positive and statistically
significant in all the models presented in Table 1.
At first glance, all the models in Table 1 suggest that income is not a significant
predictor of electoral participation in Latin America. Contrary to the expectations of
the SES model of voting behavior, wealthy individuals do not necessarily vote more
than poor individuals. However, we tried a different model specification that revealed
that the relationship between personal wealth and electoral participation exists but
it is not linear. We run the same models presented above, but this time including
all the income categories as dummies, excluding the highest and the lowest income
categories that served as baseline categories– (see Table 2).8
The results suggest that those who have no income at all tend to vote less than
all the other respondents. In sum, the level of income does not matter, but destitute
individuals vote less than the rest of the population.9 Since extreme poverty is more
8Table 2 presents only the coefficients of the income dummies in the full logistic regression with
country fixed effects. None of the other variables in the model changed sign or significance level
with the introduction of the income dummies. The full model is available upon request.
9We conducted a one-way ANOVA test which leads to similar conclusions. This statistical proce-
dure shows that individuals in the two lower income categories (0 and 1) are significantly less likely
to vote than all the other respondents. The differences in voter turnout between the other categories
are small and not statistically significant. These additional tests are available upon request from
the authors.
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Table 1: Determinants of Voter Turnout in Latin America, Logistic, Fixed Effects, and
Multilevel Logistic Models
(1) (2) (3)




Income 0.007 0.012 0.013
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Education 0.367*** 0.306*** 0.306***
(0.06) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.665*** 0.675*** 0.675***
(0.06) (0.02) (0.02)
Gender -0.233*** -0.209*** -0.208***
(0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
MOTIVATIONS
Satisfaction 0.07 0.026 0.026
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Trust elections 0.088*** 0.056*** 0.057***
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Political Efficacy -0.004 -0.026** -0.026**
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Interest in politics 0.105* 0.134*** 0.133***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Political Awareness 0.091** 0.114*** 0.113***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Partisanship 0.377*** 0.553*** 0.555***
(0.11) (0.05) (0.05)
NETWORKS
Employment status 0.500*** 0.532*** 0.530***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Church attendance -0.026 -0.001 -0.002
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Membership index 0.136** 0.180*** 0.181***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
Urban/Rural -0.102 -0.115* -0.111*
(0.11) (0.05) (0.05)




















N individuals 22,457 22,457 22,457
N countries 17 17 17
* p<0.1, two-tailed. ** p<0.05, two-tailed. *** p<0.001, two-tailed.
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Table 2: Logistic Regressions with Income Dummies
Income Level Full Model with Income
Dummies
Full Model with Income
Dummies
(Baseline tenth decile) (Baseline No Income)
No Income -0.463**
(0.190)
1st decile -0.119 0.344***
(0.164) (0.126)
2nd decile -0.003 0.460***
(0.159) (0.124)
3rd decile -0.027 0.436***
(0.157) (0.123)
4th decile 0.053 0.516***
(0.157) (0.124)
5th decile -0.044 0.420***
(0.158) (0.127)
6th decile -0.114 0.350***
(0.16) (0.132)
7th decile 0.065 0.528***
(0.167) (0.141)
8th decile -0.04 0.423***
(0.177) (0.153)




* p<0.1, two-tailed. ** p<0.05, two-tailed. *** p<0.001, two-tailed.
common in some Latin American countries than in the industrialized world, this is
an interesting finding which is in line with our theoretical expectation.10
The impact of gender on voter turnout is also worth noting. The few studies
that analyze women’s political involvement in Latin America conclude that there is
a “gender gap” in political participation, and that women are less likely to be polit-
ically engaged in the region (Desposato & Norrander, 2009). Our results, however,
show the opposite effect. Women appear to vote more than men in Latin American
elections.11 Desposato and Norrander (2009) point out that the “gender gap” in po-
litical participation is attenuated when there is a high level of women participation in
public office – which is an effect of “symbolic representation.”12 In a similar vein, our
findings about women’s higher turnout in Latin America may be capturing impor-
tant changes to women’s status in the political arena that are causing women to vote
10We also considered the nonlinear effects of income by adding squared income as an additional
independent variable in the model, but the polynomial regression estimates did not reveal a nonlinear
effect. This additional model is available upon request from the authors.
11Desposato and Norrander (2009) did not analyze electoral participation, so our different results
may also result from the fact that we are looking at a different dependent variable.
12Schwindt-Bayer (2010) looks at symbolic representation and notes that higher levels of women in
the legislature increase women’s positive feelings about democracy, which may also have an impact
on their propensity to vote.
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more, thus challenging the conventional wisdom. For instance, due to gender quotas,
women have very high levels of parliamentary representation in Argentina, Mexico,
Peru, and the Dominican Republic; and Uruguay recently passed a gender quota law
that will boost its numbers.13 As can be observed in Table 4, these are precisely the
countries where women tend to vote more than men.
Looking then at the coefficients for motivational variables, our findings underline
the importance of trust in elections, interest in politics, partisanship, and political
awareness as significant predictors of voting turnout. All these variables have sig-
nificant and positive effects on electoral participation. That is, trustful, interested,
partisan, and informed citizens are more likely to participate in elections. In contrast,
satisfaction with democracy has no effect on individuals’ decision to vote. Surpris-
ingly, the coefficient for political efficacy is significant but negative in models 2 and 3.
In other words, the perception that government is responsive to individuals’ concerns
seems to discourage electoral participation. This counterintuitive finding may simply
reflect that voting offers a possibility for disenchanted voters who feel un-efficacious
to express their frustration by supporting anti-systemic or outsider candidates (Car-
reras, forthcoming; Doyle, 2011). Citizens who perceive that the government pays
attention to their aspirations may paradoxically become more apathetic. However,
the impact of efficacy on turnout is very small as it will be revealed in the next
section.14
Finally, we also evaluate the effect of recruitment networks on voters’ mobilization.
Table 1 shows that individuals who are employed and citizens actively engaged in civic
associations are significantly more likely to vote than unemployed individuals, and
unengaged individuals. As we hypothesized, citizens involved in large social networks
are more likely to be politically engaged and to participate in electoral processes.
The results also suggest that individuals’ place of residence influences their elec-
toral behavior. Models 2 and 3 present evidence that the likelihood that an individual
votes in presidential elections decreases if the voter lives in urban areas. This finding
may be explained by the greater social cohesion in rural areas. Social pressure to par-
ticipate may be felt much more strongly in rural areas, which house more tightly-knit
13Personal communication with Jennifer Piscopo (August 2012).
14While political efficacy is often measured by creating an index, our measure of ”political efficacy”
is based on the only measure of external efficacy available in the LAPOP surveys which may increase
measurement error. Hence, the findings about the impact of efficacy on turnout in Latin America
are tentative and should be interpreted with caution.
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communities (Bratton, Chu, & Lagos, 2010; Hoffmann-Martinot, 1994). Moreover,
conditions for political mobilization through patronage networks are more favorable
in rural areas, as a recent study of electoral participation in Africa has demonstrated
(Kuenzi & Lambright, 2011).
In sum, Table 1 shows the main factors explaining individual incentives to vote
in Latin America. As discussed in the theory section, these incentives are driven by
political motivations, individual socio-demographic attributes, and social networks.
Older, educated, politically motivated, and civic-active citizens are more likely to vote
in Latin America.
Models 2 and 3 also evaluate the effect of contextual-level and institutional vari-
ables. For ease of presentation, the estimates of the seventeen country dummies in
Model 2 are not shown. In all but two cases, the coefficients of the country dummy
variables were statistically significant at p < 0.1 in a two-tailed test. The sign and
magnitude of the specific country coefficients are not, in and of themselves, of interest
here but the results suggest that it is important to take contextual and institutional
factors into account when explaining electoral participation in the region. In order
to tease out some of these contextual factors, Model 3 estimates a multi-level logis-
tic model. This final model also evaluates how institutional, political and economic
conditions at the country level could change the effect of our variables of interest on
electoral turnout. Model 3 estimates such effects using a two level random-coefficients
model.
Five contextual variables are incorporated into our final model: compulsory vot-
ing, concurrent elections, closeness of the electoral result (percentage gap between the
first and the second most voted candidates), the Polity IV score (level of democracy),
and GDP per capita. In line with previous literature (Fornos et al., 2004; Kostadinova
& Power, 2007), the existence of compulsory voting laws effectively shapes individual
behavior. The likelihood that an individual decides to vote in presidential elections
increases significantly in countries where voting is compulsory, especially in countries
where such laws are effectively enforced. Electoral participation also tends to be
higher when the elections are competitive, i.e. when the difference between the first
and the second most voted candidates in the presidential elections is small (see Cox
& Munger, 1989). However, our results cast doubts on previous findings regarding
the link between turnout and concurrent elections. As expected, the coefficient for
the variable measuring whether the elections are concurrent is positive, but it does
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not reach statistical significance. Similarly, the level of democracy (Polity IV score)
and GDP per capita are not significant predictors of electoral participation in Latin
American elections. Overall, our results confirm most of the findings of previous
studies regarding the contextual factors that influence electoral participation in Latin
America (Fornos et al., 2004; Kostadinova & Power, 2007; Pe´rez-Lin˜a´n, 2001).
Which Theoretical Perspective Explains More in
Latin America?
The previous section showed that a series of variables are statistically significant
individual-level predictors of turnout in Latin America. Our main objective, however,
is to assess which of the three perspectives detailed above (resources, motivations,
and immersion in mobilization networks) carries more explanatory power. In order
to estimate precisely what effect the independent variables of interest have on the
probability of voting, we calculated the predicted probabilities of participating in the
elections. Table 3 presents the predicted probabilities of voting at different values of
the independent variables that were statistically significant in Model 3 above, holding
all other variables at their means. As an additional way of estimating more precisely
the impact of specific variables on the likelihood of electoral participation in Latin
America, we run the logistic regression in Table 1 for each individual country. This
allows us to evaluate whether the statistically significant variables in the pooled model
are also significant predictors of turnout in individual Latin American countries. We
present this information in Table 4.
The predicted probabilities clearly show that two “resources” variables (age and
education) stand out as the best individual-level predictors of electoral participation
in our model. The table demonstrates that a strong socialization effect exists. Age can
be considered as a proxy for political experience. As expected from the socialization
hypothesis, the youngest voters (age 18-24) are much less likely to vote than the rest
of the population. This suggests that voters get socialized into politics quite fast in
the workplace or in their social networks. The likelihood of voting keeps increasing as
age increases, but the gap between the different age categories gradually diminishes.
This is consistent with the “start-up-slow-down-model” developed by Verba and Nie
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Table 3: Predicted Probabilities of Voting in Latin America (2010)
















Low trust in elections (1) 0.83
High trust in elections (7) 0.87
Low efficacy (1) 0.86
High efficacy (7) 0.85
Low political interest (1) 0.84
High political interest (4) 0.88
Low political information (1) 0.80




No membership civic organizations 0.83
Membership 1 civic organization 0.86
Membership 2 civic organizations 0.88
Membership +3 civic organizations 0.90
Rural 0.87
Urban 0.85
Never exposed to clientelism 0.85
Sometimes exposed to clientelism 0.86
Often exposed to clientelism 0.87
CONTEXTUAL FACTORS
No compulsory voting 0.76
Compulsory voting, but not enforced 0.84




(1972).15 Age is not only the strongest predictor of turnout according to the predicted
probabilities; it is also the most consistent one across the region (see Table 4).16
The second strong predictor of electoral participation in Latin America is educa-
tion. We hypothesized that turnout should increase as the level of education increases,
because educated individuals are more likely to absorb complex political information
and become politically interested. This is exactly what the predicted probabilities
reveal. Although the probability of voting keeps increasing as the level of education
increases, the biggest differences are the ones that exist between no education vs.
primary, and primary vs. secondary. As with the variable age, education is also
a statistically significant predictor of electoral participation in the vast majority of
Latin American countries (fourteen out of eighteen).
The motivation variables also have an impact on the probability of participating
in the elections, but the substantive effect of these factors pales in comparison with
the variables “age” and “education”. Three variables (trust in elections, political in-
formation, and political interest) have a moderate impact on electoral participation.
As can be observed in Table 3, the gap between those who express low and high val-
ues for these three variables is between 4% and 6%, which is a significant impact but
substantively less important than the effect of voters’ resources. Similarly, these three
variables are statistically significant predictors of turnout in a considerable number
of countries (seven countries for the variables “trust in elections” and “political infor-
mation”, ten countries for the variable “political interest”); but they do not explain
15We ran additional models including the age categories as dummies, which confirmed that the
effect of age is nonlinear. In fact, the results suggest that electoral participation keeps increasing
as age increases until age 50. After that age, voter turnout reaches a plateau. The models with
the age dummies do not show a statistically significant difference in electoral participation between
respondents in the category 50-64 and respondents in the category 65+. These models are available
upon request from the authors.
16Part of the age effect revealed here may actually result from a cohort effect instead. Actually,
there may be a cohort effect in countries that transitioned to democracy in the 1980s-1990s. The
older generations have experienced authoritarian periods, and may give more value to democratic
elections than younger generations who take democratic elections for granted. Hence, younger
generations may vote less because they belong to a more politically apathetic cohort. However,
the variable ”age” is also a statistically significant predictor of electoral participation in countries
that were constantly democratic since the 1950s (Colombia, Costa Rica, and Venezuela), and the
predicted probabilities of electoral participation in each country –not shown here but available upon
request– reveal that the impact of age is equally strong in these countries as in Southern Cone
countries that transitioned to democracy in the 1980s. Hence, we are confident that most of the
effect of the age variable presented in the paper really corresponds to the impact of age on turnout
–rather than to a cohort effect–.
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electoral participation in many other nations.
Table 4: Voter Turnout Latin America, by country
ARG BOL BRA CHI COL CR DR ECU GUA
RESOURCES
Income 0.09* 0.06 -0.10** -0.03 0.05 0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.01
Education 0.16 0.34** 0.41** 0.13 0.04 0.25* 0.22* 0.39** 0.45***
Age 0.31*** 0.56*** 0.80*** 0.08 0.99*** 0.91*** 0.65*** 0.12* 0.78***
Gender -0.55** 0.04 -0.2 -0.47 -0.25* -0.09 -0.41** -0.26 0.33**
MOTIVATIONS
Satisfaction democracy 0.15 -0.16 0.12 -0.22 0.01 0.23** 0.09 -0.12 0.03
Trust elections -0.02 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.13** 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.04
Political efficacy -0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.08**
Interest in politics 0.25** 0.26** 0.05 0.38** 0.23** 0.18** 0.27** -0.06 0.1
Political awareness 0.21** 0.13 0.09 0.17 0.11 0.18* -0.01 0.17* 0.09
Partisanship 0.34 0.11 0.33** 0.75 0.28* 1.23*** 0.75*** 0.09 0.36*
NETWORKS
Employment 0.40** 0.47** 0.78*** 0.61** 0.63*** 0.11 0.37** 0.78*** 0.84***
Church attendance -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.24** -0.02 0 -0.07 0.07 0.11*
Membership -0.18 0.04 0.22** 0.02 0.30** 0.03 0.18** 0.07 0.27**
Urban/Rural 0.1 0.01 -0.29 -1.62** -0.24 -0.08 -0.31 -0.11 -0.06
Clientelism 0.16 0.45** 0 -0.54 0.30** 0.03 0.46*** 0.08 0.14
Constant -1.74** -1.63* -1.74** 1.83 -4.09*** -5.11*** -1.83** 0.65 -3.66***
N 886 2121 1892 1083 1196 986 1164 2336 1104
HON MEX NIC PAN PAR PER SAL URU VEN
RESOURCES
Income -0.09** -0.02 0.06 -0.05 0 0.04 -0.02 0.04 0.10**
Education 0.28** 0.44*** 0.12 0.26* 0.34** 0.90*** 0.41*** 0.36* 0.27**
Age 0.20** 0.93*** 0.50*** 0.66*** 0.90*** 1.25*** 0.50*** 0.73*** 0.63***
Gender 0.17 -0.67*** -0.19 -0.28 0.14 -0.35* -0.19 -0.51* -0.12
MOTIVATIONS
Satisfaction democracy 0.11 0.04 -0.15 0.02 0.03 -0.25* -0.01 0.24 0.09
Trust elections 0.13** 0.10** 0.06 0.10* 0.03 0.01 0.09** 0.19** 0.10**
Political efficacy 0.06 -0.02 0.01 -0.12** 0.03 0.08 -0.04 -0.09 -0.05
Interest in politics 0.43*** 0.16** 0.24** 0.01 0.32*** -0.14 0.14* -0.01 0.02
Political awareness 0.19** 0.19** 0.07 0.09 0.27* -0.02 0.09 -0.28 0.16**
Partisanship 1.06*** 0.50** 0.68*** 1.55*** 0.61*** 0.17 0.38** 0.1 0.74***
NETWORKS
Employment .35** 0.35** 0.19 0.71*** 0.54** 1.04*** 0.37** 0.76** 0.56***
Church attendance 0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.07 0.02 -0.17** -0.01 -0.04 -0.11*
Membership 0.02 0.21** 0.20** 0.06 0.05 0.30** 0.41*** 0.53** 0.29***
Urban/Rural -0.11 -0.03 -0.34** -0.11 0.16 -0.32 0.24 0.46 0.25
Clientelism NA 0.07 -0.03 0.03 0.28** 0.23 -0.23 0.19 -0.22
Constant 0.13*** -3.70*** -1.32* -1.58* -5.09*** -2.65*** -2.09*** -0.79 -3.59***
N 1255 1257 1178 1245 971 1190 1423 1279 1146
* p<0.1, two-tailed. ** p<0.05, two-tailed. *** p<0.001, two-tailed.
Two variables stand out in the set of motivation predictors (political efficacy and
partisanship), but for different reasons. In the previous section, we showed that po-
litical efficacy is a statistically significant predictor of turnout, but in the unexpected
direction (more efficacious citizens appear to vote less). However, the analysis of the
predicted probabilities and of the country-level regressions reveals that the feeling of
efficacy has very little influence on electoral participation. Citizens with low efficacy
are only 1% more likely to vote than individuals with high efficacy; and efficacy is a
statistically significant predictor of turnout in only two countries. On the contrary,
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partisanship stands out as the strongest predictor of electoral participation among
the motivation variables (difference of seven percentage points in the probability of
voting between partisans and non-partisans). Moreover, this effect is very consistent
across countries (see Table 4).
The analysis of the network variables reveals a nuanced picture. While some
factors appear to be relatively strong predictors of electoral participation (membership
in civic organizations, employment status), other variables do not explain much of
the variance in citizens’ decision of whether or not to go to the polls on election day
(clientelism, church attendance, place of residence).
Let us consider the weak predictors first. The pooled model suggested that church
attendance has very little impact on turnout. Table 4 confirms this finding, as this
variable is a statistically significant predictor of turnout in four countries only. Place
of residence is also a weak predictor of electoral participation in Latin America. The
predicted probabilities reveal that urban residents are only slightly less likely to vote
than rural residents (87% vs. 85%). Moreover, Table 4 shows that the place of res-
idence is a statistically significant predictor of electoral participation in three Latin
American countries only. Clientelism is another surprisingly weak predictor of elec-
toral participation in Latin America. Although political clientelism is a statistically
significant predictor of turnout in the pooled multilevel model, the predicted prob-
abilities of voting increase only slightly when citizens are exposed to clientelism in
their networks. Moreover, Table 4 reveals that this factor is a statistically significant
predictor of turnout in only four countries.
The other mobilization variables in our model have a much stronger impact on
electoral participation. Full-time employment and membership in civic organizations
are statistically significant predictors of electoral participation in the pooled hier-
archical model (Table 1) and in the majority of countries (Table 4). Besides, the
predicted probabilities in Table 3 demonstrate a strong substantive impact of these
two “network” variables on turnout.
It is useful to compare the predicted probabilities of electoral participation pre-
sented so far with the predicted probabilities of voting at different levels of the contex-
tual factors. Conclusions about the impact of contextual factors on citizens’ decision
to vote are more tentative because the number of observations in the second level
of analysis is relatively low (17). The two contextual factors that are statistically
significant in the hierarchical models appear to have a strong impact on electoral par-
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ticipation. Individuals living in countries that have compulsory voting laws are much
more likely to go to the polls on election day. Similarly, individuals have a significantly
higher probability of voting when they face close electoral contests. These effects are
similar in size to the impact of the most influential individual-level factors.17
As a final probe of the substantive impact of each theoretical perspective, we
calculated measures of fit for the full logistic model and for reduced models excluding
the variables from one or two of the three perspectives. The McKelvey & Zavoina’s R-
squared and McFadden’s R-squared for these reduced models are presented in Table
5. These measures of fit confirm our overall findings. Both measures of fit produce
significantly higher values in the reduced model 1 (including only the set of resources
variables) than in the reduced model 2 (motivations model) and in the reduced model
3 (networks model). We reach the same conclusion if we compare the change in R-
squared attributable to each of the three set of variables through entering them to the
equation at the last step. Comparing the reduced models 4, 5, and 6 to the full model
it is clear that entering the set of resources variables as the last step increases the
variability explained much more than if the set of motivation variables or mobilization
variables are entered to the equation as the final step. In sum, all our results point
to the importance of voters’ resources –especially age and education– in explaining
electoral participation.
Table 5: Comparing Models of Electoral Turnout in Latin America (Measures of Fit)
McKelvey & Zavoinas R2 McFadden’s R2
Reduced Model 1: Resources 0.174 0.092
Reduced Model 2: Motivations 0.034 0.019
Reduced Model 3: Networks 0.036 0.019
Reduced Model 4: Resources + Motivations 0.196 0.103
Reduced Model 5: Resources + Networks 0.191 0.104
Reduced Model 6: Motivations + Networks 0.062 0.034
Full Model 0.212 0.116
The importance of voter’s resources to explain turnout in Latin America contrasts
with the little influence that variables such as income or education have on electoral
participation in developed countries. Particularly, education is a very poor predictor
of electoral participation in many industrialized countries (Nevitte, Blais, Gidengil,
& Nadeau, 2009; Verba et al., 1978). Why are citizens with a low socioeconomic
17However, rather than seeing individual-level and contextual factors as competing explanations,
it makes sense to analyze the interaction of these two factors. This analysis is beyond the scope of
this article, but future studies should assess the structural conditions that activate individual-level
predictors.
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status (i.e. destitute and poorly educated individuals) less likely to go to the polls
in Latin America but not in most industrialized countries? We believe there are two
main reasons that explain this pattern. First, the gap between those that have a low
level of education and those that have a high level of education is more remarkable in
Latin America than in most industrialized countries. As we showed in our analysis, the
citizens that are least likely to vote are those that did not complete primary education
(34.5% of the respondents in our sample find themselves in this situation). Since
most citizens in developed countries crossed this minimum threshold of instruction
(the vast majority of citizens at least completed primary school), it makes sense
that the effect of education on electoral participation is less remarkable.18 Second,
the literature suggests that voters’ resources will matter less when leftist parties
or labor movements are able to mobilize lower status individuals (Gallego, 2010).
Latin American countries have lacked precisely the type of labor parties that were
created in Europe in the twentieth century to mobilize the working-class electorate
(Bartolini, 2000). Latin American party systems have traditionally been dominated
by “parties of a multiclass appeal and ideological pragmatism” (Dix, 1989: 33). These
catch-all parties do not develop programmatic linkages with voters along existing
lines of societal cleavages, and are less effective at mobilizing individuals with low
socioeconomic status. Moreover, the neoliberal turn in the 1990s has considerably
weakened labor movements in the region, thereby eroding a potential mobilization
arena that could encourage disadvantaged social groups to go to the polls (Roberts,
2002). In sum, a series of structural factors help explain the divergent impact of
voters’ resources on electoral participation across different regions.
Conclusion
In this article, we assessed the relevance of three different theoretical perspectives (re-
sources, motivations, and mobilization networks) to explain electoral participation in
Latin America. The empirical results do not show one of the three theoretical perspec-
tives as uniformly better at explaining turnout in the region. Within each perspective,
some variables are strong predictors of electoral participation, while other factors only
18According to UNESCO statistics, the average enrolment rate in secondary education in 2009
was 91.5% in OECD countries (excluding Mexico and Chile), but only 66.9% in the Latin American
countries included in this analysis (data available online: http://www.uis.unesco.org).
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marginally influence turnout. But the strongest predictors in all of our models are
two individual resources (education and age –proxy for political experience–). Our
analysis reveals that these objective characteristics of the voters explain much more
than their subjective motivations (trust in elections, political efficacy, and interest
in politics). We also show that some mobilization networks are important to acti-
vate turnout in Latin America (party networks, civic associations, working place),
but other networks do not affect electoral participation in the region –or do it only
marginally– (place of residence, clientelistic networks, religious congregations).
The conventional wisdom regarding turnout in Latin America is that institutions
matter much more than socioeconomic factors. In the most comprehensive analysis of
electoral participation in the region to date, Fornos et al. (2004: 909) indeed conclude
that “socioeconomic variables, which are found to have strong effects on turnout in
Western democracies, are unrelated to turnout in Latin American countries.” The
present analysis challenges the accepted wisdom. We demonstrate that the strongest
predictors of turnout in the region (education, age, employment status) are all socioe-
conomic variables. Income also matters but the impact is not linear. Our analysis
reveals that individuals in situation of extreme poverty are less likely to vote than
the rest of the population.
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